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The Unfolding Story of 
the Second Demographic 
Transition
RON LESTHAEGHE
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION refers to the declines in fertility and mortality 
that occurred in Western countries from the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies onward and during the second half of the twentieth century in much 
of the rest of the world. At present, there are barely a dozen countries that 
have not begun a fertility decline. In the West, the control of fertility within 
wedlock occurred in tandem with a reduction in celibacy and a lowering of 
ages at marriage, signaling a major departure from its Malthusian marriage 
system. In the rest of the world, early marriage for women—often the re-
sult of arrangements between families or lineages—gave way to much later 
marriage, partly because of more individual partner choice and partly as a 
response to economic factors. On the whole, William Goode’s prediction of 
1963 forecasting a rise in non-Western ages at marriage has largely been 
borne out by the record of the last 40 years. This increase in ages at marriage 
has furthermore been a major component in the overall fertility decline in 
many non-Western countries. 
But even before the demographic transition started spreading from the 
West and Japan to the less developed countries, Western populations were 
initiating a process that would take them far beyond what postwar demo-
graphic transition theory had forecasted.1 The fertility decline did not stop at 
around two children on average, and Western marriage would not stay early 
or attract the vast majority of men and women. The end product does not 
seem to be a balanced stationary population with zero population growth and 
little or no need for immigrants. This “second demographic transition” (SDT) 
brings sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements 
other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and procreation, 
and no stationary population. Instead, Western populations face declining 
sizes, and if it were not for immigration, that decline would already have 
started in many European countries. In addition, continued gains in longev-
ity at older ages in tandem with sustained sub-replacement fertility will lead 
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to additional population aging. This aging cannot be fully compensated by 
“replacement migration.”
 The early signs of the second demographic transition emerged in the 
1950s: divorce rates were rising, especially in the United States and Scandi-
navia, and the departure from a life-long commitment was justified by the 
logic that “a good divorce is better than a bad marriage.” From the second 
half of the 1960s onward, fertility started falling from its  “baby boom” high. 
Moreover, the trend in ages at first marriage was reversed again, and propor-
tions single started rising. Soon thereafter, it became evident that premarital 
cohabitation was on the rise and that divorce and widowhood were followed 
less frequently by remarriage and more often by postmarital cohabitation. 
By the 1980s even procreation within cohabiting unions had spread from 
Scandinavia to the rest of Western Europe. In both France and the United 
Kingdom, more than 40 percent of all births now occur out of wedlock. In 
1960 the figure for both countries was 6 percent. 
The notion of a second demographic transition, which Dirk van de Kaa 
and I introduced in 1986 in a short article in the Dutch sociology journal 
Mens en Maatschappij, has been criticized from different perspectives.2 First, it 
was maintained that the SDT would merely be the continuation of the one 
and only transition (e.g., Cliquet 1992). Second, according to David Coleman 
(2004, p. 11), it would not be a “second transition,” but merely a “secondary 
feature” of the demographic transition. The second demographic transition 
would, according to Coleman, not even be demographic in nature, but only 
a “partial analysis of life style preferences.” Third, a more common argument, 
particularly in the 1990s, has been that the SDT is an archetypical Western 
European (plus Canadian and Australian) feature that would not spread to 
the United States or to Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe, let alone Asia. 
Instead, the demographic changes in the latter parts of Europe could be ac-
counted for by the economic turmoil associated with the transition from Com-
munist to market economies, without involving the operation of a cultural 
shift. In the United States, widely held Christian values would stem the tide 
and strengthen American “exceptionalism,” as for instance exhibited by the 
absence of sub-replacement fertility. Fourth, it was suggested that the theory 
of the SDT overemphasized the link between the transformation in family 
relationships (especially cohabitation) and the prevalence of sub-replacement 
fertility. In other words, the family formation variables associated with the 
SDT would not be as cohesive as envisaged in 1986. Fifth, the SDT theory 
could not account for the great variety of fertility levels from barely below 
replacement to “lowest low.” Finally, questions inevitably arose about the 
universality of the SDT: could its features spread to Asia and other continents 
as societies grew richer, or is the SDT a Western idiosyncrasy and bound to 
remain so?
These questions set the agenda for the following analysis. 
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Is the second demographic transition merely 
the continuation of the first?
The idea of the distinctness of the SDT stems from Philippe Ariès’s analysis 
of the history of childhood (1962) and, as van de Kaa and I have repeatedly 
pointed out, from his 1980 article on the two successive and distinct motiva-
tions for parenthood. During the first demographic transition, the decline in 
fertility was “unleashed by an enormous sentimental and financial investment 
in the child” (i.e., the “king child era,” to use Ariès’s term)(Ariès 1980, p. 649), 
whereas the motivation during the second transition is adult self-realization 
within the role or life style as a parent or more complete and fulfilled adult. 
This major shift is also propped up by the innovation of hormonal and other 
forms of highly efficient contraception. During the first transition couples 
chose to adopt contraception in order to avoid pregnancies; during the second, 
the basic decision is to stop contraception in order to start a pregnancy. 
The other “root” of the SDT theory was connected to a reaction of van de 
Kaa and myself toward the cyclical fertility theory, as formulated by Richard 
Easterlin (1973). In this theory, small cohorts would have better employ-
ment opportunities and hence earlier marriage and higher fertility, whereas 
large cohorts would have the opposite life chances and inverse demographic 
responses. Easterlin’s theory accounts well for the marriage boom and baby 
boom of the 1960s, and also for the subsequent baby bust of the 1970s. But 
the theory equally predicts further cycles produced by the earlier ones, and 
hence expects a return of fertility to higher levels when smaller cohorts reach 
the reproductive years. By the middle of the 1980s van de Kaa and I had 
become convinced that sub-replacement fertility was not only going to last 
much longer, but could even become an “intrinsic” feature of a new demo-
graphic regime. Thus, we saw the discrediting of the model of an ultimate 
stationary population with a long-term population equilibrium, and of the 
revised version of the model that postulated cyclical fertility swings around 
replacement fertility. 
But there was more behind the idea of the second demographic tran-
sition than these two considerations. Further in the background was the 
concept of a Maslowian preference drift. Stated succinctly, Abraham Maslow 
(and others before him) noticed that greater economic development produced 
a shift in concerns about material needs (subsistence, shelter, physical and 
economic security) to a focus on non-material needs (freedom of expression, 
participation and emancipation, self-realization and autonomy, recognition). 
With such a shift in needs, a shift in the values structure would also occur, 
with tolerance for diversity and respect for individual choices gradually taking 
over as prime values from solidarity and social group adherence and cohesion. 
With this background in mind, the first demographic transition is considered 
as anchored mainly in the stage of the realization of basic material needs, 
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whereas the second demographic transition is the expression of the develop-
ment of higher-order, non-material needs and of expressive values.
Also note that the explicit inclusion of the Maslowian drift sets the SDT 
theory apart from both the neoclassic economic interpretation and any neo-
Marxist or purely structural sociology and history. The latter see demographic 
change merely as a response to changes in material circumstance and either 
fail to incorporate cultural shifts altogether or fail to specify universal mecha-
nisms that link material to non-material driving forces. At this point one will 
notice the close resemblance of the SDT theory to the theory developed by 
Ron Inglehart in the field of political science (e.g., Inglehart 1970, 1997).
Having pointed out the intellectual origins of the SDT, I now offer a 
more systematic treatment of the contrasts between the first and second 
demographic transitions. Appendix Table 1 summarizes the points discussed 
below.
Contrasting nuptiality regimes
As I indicated earlier, a first major contrast between the first and second 
transitions is their trends in nuptiality. In Western Europe the Malthusian 
pattern of late marriage weakened, mainly because of the growth of wage-
earning labor, and this basic trend toward earlier and more universal marriage 
continued until the mid-1960s. Hence, the lowest mean ages at first marriage 
since the Renaissance were reached in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Furthermore, the pockets of Western Europe where cohabitation and out-
of-wedlock fertility had remained high during the nineteenth century were 
under siege during the first half of the twentieth. Such behavior was not in 
line with the religious and secular views on what constituted a proper family. 
Extramarital fertility rates declined throughout Europe after 1900. 
By contrast, after 1965, ages at marriage rose again and cohort propor-
tions ever-married started declining (Council of Europe 2004). This resulted 
not only from an interim period of premarital cohabitation, but also from later 
home leaving and more and longer single living. The very rapid prolongation 
of education for both sexes since the 1950s and the ensuing change in the 
educational composition of Western populations contributed to this process. 
But the unfolding of the nuptiality features of the SDT did not stop at a rise 
in ages at marriage and at a mere insertion of an interim “student” period. 
Postmarital cohabitation too was on the rise, as was childbearing outside 
wedlock. And in many instances the latter trend is to some extent a “revenge 
of history”: cohabitation and procreation by non-married couples are now 
often highest where the custom prevailed longest during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.3
Another contrast between the first and second transitions pertains to 
divorce and remarriage. The first transition was preoccupied with strengthen-
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ing marriage and the family, and divorce legislation remained strict. The state 
offered little opposition to religious doctrine in this respect. Divorce on the 
basis of mutual consent was rare and mostly based on proven adultery. The 
second transition witnessed the end of a long period of low divorce rates, and 
the principle of a unique, life-long legal partnership was questioned. This took 
the form of a rational “utility” evaluation of marriage in terms of the welfare 
of both adult partners first and children second. This questioning was accom-
panied by attacks on the hypocrisy of the earlier restrictive divorce legisla-
tion that fostered concubinage instead. The outcome in Western Europe, the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand was a succession of legal 
liberalizations in the wake of a singularly rising demographic trend. And, as 
pointed out in the introduction, the onset of the rise in divorce was probably 
the very first manifestation of the accentuation of individual autonomy in 
opposing the moral order prescribed by Church and State. It should be noted, 
however, that resistance to divorce was stronger in countries or regions with 
a Catholic background than in those with a Protestant heritage. This is not so 
surprising since divorce versus the indissolubility of marriage was one of the 
key issues that led to the Reformation in the first place.
And last but not least, the first and second transitions have opposite 
patterns of remarriage. During the first, remarriages essentially involved 
widows and widowers, whereas remarriage for divorced persons meant a 
new beginning and the start of a new family: new children for a new life-
long commitment. In other words, even if divorce occurred, the institution 
of marriage was not under serious threat, and remarriage propped up fertility 
as well. Nothing of this is left in the second transition: remarriages among 
the widowed or divorced decline in favor of cohabitation or other looser ar-
rangements such as LAT (“living apart together”) relationships or intimate 
friendships.
Fertility contrasts
The theory of the second demographic transition does not merely focus on 
changing nuptiality and family patterns, as Coleman contends, but is equally 
concerned with fertility. Recall that Ariès’s essay on two successive fertility 
motivations and Easterlin’s work on a cyclical fertility model were two in-
tellectual foundations of the theory. Even if that were not the case, fertility 
cannot be studied without regard to the fundamental changes in patterns 
of household formation and without the framework of changing life style 
preferences. 
During the first transition, fertility was increasingly confined to mar-
riage, contraception affected mostly fertility at older ages, mean ages at first 
parenthood declined, and childlessness among married couples was low. 
There are examples of below-replacement fertility during the first transition, 
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but these correspond to exceptional periods of economic crisis or war. Sub-
replacement fertility is not an intrinsic characteristic of the first transition. 
Under more favorable conditions, as for instance after World War II, fertility 
levels are well above replacement level, and this holds not only for period 
fertility indicators but also for cohort fertility. The baby boom and the mar-
riage boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s are the last typical features of 
the first demographic transition in the industrialized world. Another salient 
characteristic of the fertility regime during the first transition was its reliance 
on imperfect contraception. Until the 1960s, withdrawal was largely the 
method used by the working classes, and rhythm by better-educated or more 
religious couples. Both methods led to contraceptive failures and unintended 
pregnancies, and these kept fertility above replacement level. Particularly 
such contraceptive failures at higher ages became increasingly undesirable 
and prompted the demand for more effective contraception.
The second demographic transition started with a multifaceted revolu-
tion, and all aspects of it affect fertility. First, a contraceptive revolution was 
heralded by the invention of the pill and the re-invention of IUDs. All of these 
were perfected very rapidly, and hormonal contraception was particularly 
suited for postponing and spacing births. Ansley Coale’s “learning curve” of 
contraception, which increased monotonically with age and parity and fitted 
the first transition experience so well, was no longer applicable in the West. 
After an interim period with increased incidence of “shotgun marriages” (gen-
erally around 1965–75), the use of highly efficient and reliable contraception 
started at young ages and permitted postponement of childbearing as a goal 
in its own right. Second, the sexual revolution marked a forceful reaction to 
the notions that sex is confined to marriage and mainly for procreation only. 
Younger generations sought the value of sex for its own sake and accused 
their parents’ generation of hypocrisy. Ages at first sexual intercourse declined 
during the second transition. Third, a gender revolution occurred whereby 
women were no longer subservient to men and husbands, but asserted the 
right to regulate their fertility. Women’s desire for “biological autonomy” 
was articulated by subsequent quests for the liberalization of induced abor-
tion. Finally, these three revolutions fit within the framework of a rejection 
of authority and an overhaul of the normative structure. Parents, educators, 
churches, army, and much of the entire state apparatus ended up in the dock. 
This entire ideational reorientation, if not revolution, occurred during the 
peak years of economic growth and shaped all aspects of the SDT.
The pattern of fertility associated with the second demographic transi-
tion is its marked degree of postponement. Mean ages at first parenthood for 
women in sexual unions rose rapidly and to unprecedented levels in several 
Western European populations. The net outcome was sub-replacement fer-
tility: without the ethnic component (such as Hispanics in the US or Maoris 
in New Zealand), all OECD countries have sub-replacement fertility. Admit-
tedly, period measures such as the total fertility rate are depressed as a result 
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of continued postponement, but even the end of such postponement would 
not be likely to bring period fertility back to a TFR of 2.1. Most cohorts of the 
world’s white (and Japanese) national populations born after 1960 will not 
rebound to that level (cf. Frejka and Calot 2001; Lesthaeghe 2001; Council 
of Europe 2004). However, the degree of heterogeneity in cohort fertility is 
substantial and by no means solely the outcome of ethnic composition fac-
tors. In the West, Scandinavian, British, and French cohorts born in 1960 still 
come close to replacement fertility, whereas corresponding cohort levels fall 
below 1.7 in Austria, Germany, and Italy. In Central and Eastern Europe, the 
cohort of 1960 will still reach two children on average, but not in the Rus-
sian Federation, Slovenia, and the three Baltic countries (Council of Europe 
2004). Moreover, in Western and Southern Europe, with current total period 
fertility rates below 1.5, the catching up of fertility after age 30 has remained 
too weak to offset the effect of postponement. The result of sustained sub-
replacement fertility is that another, but originally unanticipated trait of the 
second demographic transition may be in the making: continued reliance on 
international migration to partially offset the population decline that would 
otherwise emerge within a few years. 
We are evidently far from the ideal first transition outcome of a new 
stationary population corresponding to high life expectancy, replacement fer-
tility, and little need for immigration. And we are getting further and further 
removed from the fertility-enhancing prop of that demographic model— the 
dominance of a single form of living arrangement for couples and children, 
namely marriage. Finally, the linchpin of the first transition system has totally 
eroded: collective behavior is no longer kept in check by a strong normative 
structure based on a familistic ideology supported by both Church and State. 
Instead, the new regime is governed by the primacy of individual choice. Or as 
van de Kaa (2004, p. 77) has put it, fertility is now merely a “derivative,” the 
outcome of a prolonged “process of self-questioning and self-confrontation 
by prospective parents…[in which] the pair will weigh a great many issues, 
including direct costs and opportunity costs, but their guiding light will be 
the outcome of self-confrontation. Would a conception and having a child 
be self-fulfilling?”
Underlying societal contrasts
To this point we have discussed the differences between the first and sec-
ond transitions mainly in terms of their demographic contrasts. But both 
transitions of course have their roots in distinct historical periods of societal 
development. 
With the exception of the very early eighteenth-century fertility decline 
in France and a few other smaller areas in Europe, much of the first transition 
was an integral part of development in which economic growth fostered ma-
terial aspirations and improvements in living conditions. The preoccupations 
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of the period 1860–1960 were mainly concerned with increasing household 
real income, improving working and housing conditions, raising standards of 
health and life expectancy, improving human capital by investing in educa-
tion, and providing a safety net through the gradual construction of a social 
security system. In Europe, these social goals were shared and promoted by all 
ideological, religious, or political factions (also known as “pillars” since each 
of them integrates a political party, a cluster of labor unions, news media, 
and social services into a closely tied organizational network). And in this 
endeavor, solidarity was a central concept. All pillars also had their views on 
the desirable evolution of the family.
For the religious pillars (Catholic, Protestant, and later Christian-Demo-
crat) these views were based on the holiness of matrimony, but their defense 
of a closely knit conjugal family also stemmed from fears that industrial so-
ciety would lead to immorality, various social pathologies, and atheism. The 
secular pillars (Liberal and Socialist) equally saw the family as a first line of 
defense against the social ills of the nineteenth century, and as the foundation 
for a new social order based on humanistic principles. Hence, although for 
partially different reasons, all pillars considered the family as the cornerstone 
of society. Both material and moral uplifting would furthermore be served 
best by a sharp gender-based division of labor within the family: husbands 
assumed their responsibilities as devoted breadwinners, and wives became the 
caretakers of all matters related to quality of life. For this to be realized, male 
incomes needed to be high enough so that women could assume the role of 
housewives. In other words, all pillars, including the Socialist and even the 
Western European Communist ones during the interbellum, contributed to 
the embourgeoisement of the working class through this propagation of the 
breadwinner–housewife model. 
In short, all social classes were expected to adhere to a single fam-
ily model that was buttressed by highly ordered life-course transitions: no 
marriage without solid financial basis or prospects, and procreation strictly 
within wedlock. The Malthusian preconditions of a “prudent” marriage were 
readapted to the social aspirations of the new industrial society.
The second demographic transition, on the other hand, is founded on 
the rise of the higher-order needs as defined by Maslow (1954). Once the 
basic material preoccupations, particularly long-term financial security, are 
satisfied through welfare state provisions, more existential and expressive 
needs become articulated. These are centered on self-actualization in for-
mulating goals, individual autonomy in choosing means, and recognition by 
others for their realization. These features emerge in a variety of domains, 
and this is why the SDT can be linked to a wide variety of empirical indicators 
of ideational change. 
In the political sphere such higher-order or “post-materialist” (Inglehart 
1970) needs deal, inter alia, with the quest for more direct, grassroots democ-
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racy, openness of government, rejection of political patronage, decline of 
life-long loyalty to political or religious pillars, and the rise of ecological and 
other quality-oriented issues on the political agenda. The negative manifesta-
tion is rising distrust in politics and institutions and growing political anomy 
that can fuel right wing extremism. The state is no longer viewed as a benign 
provider, but rather more as an Orwellian “big brother.” A corollary here is 
the disengagement from civic, professional, and community networks (e.g., 
Putnam 2000). It is likely, however, that such networks were partially sub-
stituted by more expressive (fitness clubs, meditation gatherings) or more 
affective (friendships) types of social capital. Values of work and socialization 
equally display a profound shift in favor of the expressive traits, and above all 
away from respect for authority. In the work sphere, one is no longer satisfied 
with good material conditions (pay, job security, vacations), but expressive 
traits are more often being valued (e.g., contact with others, challenging and 
innovative work, variation in tasks, flexible time). Obviously this “anti-Ford-
ist” orientation was initially the result of rising education and the growth 
of white-collar employment (e.g., Kohn 1977), but it has now spread to all 
social classes and types of employment. A close parallel can be found in the 
domain of socialization (e.g., Alwin 1989): all elements typical of conformity 
(obedience, order and neatness, thrift and hard work, traditional gender roles, 
religious faith) and those linked to social orientations (loyalty, solidarity, 
consideration for others) have gradually given way to expressive traits that 
stress personality (being interested in how and why, capability of thinking 
for oneself, self-presentation, independence, and autonomy). Needless to say, 
the quest for more symmetrical gender relations fits within this articulation 
of higher-order needs and expressive social roles.
One transition or two?
Evidently the higher-order needs can only be articulated once the lower-order 
ones have been sufficiently met. Similarly the SDT squarely stands on the 
shoulders of its predecessor, the first transition. But to consider the features of 
the second demographic transition as “secondary,” as suggested by Coleman, 
or as part and parcel of a single transition, is another matter. My problem with 
these views is that they fail to realize both the magnitude of the contrast and 
the importance of the societal implications for the future.
 More specifically, the “one transition only” view fails to recognize 
that the first and second transitions are sufficiently differentiated and even 
antagonistic in terms of most family-formation variables (including fertility 
motivations). The “unitarian” view furthermore misses the point that the 
first and second transitions correspond to two distinct historical phases, have 
a distinct “logique sociale,” and are buttressed by distinct patterns of political 
organization. In short, the “one transition” view simply blurs history.
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Last but not least, the demographic implications of the SDT for the future 
are fundamentally different from the equilibrium implied by the first transi-
tion. SDT theorists expect much rougher seas ahead: (1) more pronounced 
population aging as a result of sub-replacement fertility, hence more pressure 
on the welfare state, (2) greater reliance on immigration and consequently a 
further expansion of multi-ethnicity and multi-cultural traits in societies, (3) 
less stress on social cohesion (e.g., Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004), and (4) a 
greater incidence of family instability and concomitant social problems (e.g., 
poverty among singles or in one-parent households). As Kathleen Kiernan 
(2001) warned, “the SDT is not kind to all.”
So far, I have explained why it makes sense to distinguish the successive 
historical steps from one transition to the next. In the following section I ad-
dress the geographic diffusion of the SDT to other parts of Europe.
Is the second demographic transition only a 
Northern and Western European idiosyncrasy?
Toward the end of the 1980s, several features of the SDT seemed to stop at the 
northern slopes of the Alps and the Pyrenees: the incidence of cohabitation 
in Southern European countries remained low, and the rise in extramarital 
fertility was either absent or modest. Instead, younger adults predominantly 
remained in or stayed attached to their parental homes. Also until around 
1990, patterns of early marriage and fertility had been maintained in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Twenty years ago, one could still argue that the SDT 
would remain a “parochial” idiosyncrasy, limited to Western and Northern 
Europe. Admittedly, features of the SDT had emerged in European popula-
tions across the oceans (in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the US),4 but 
they failed to cross two geopolitical divides on the old continent.
Central and Eastern Europe
In Central and Eastern Europe, this picture changed completely after the 
collapse of the Communist regimes in 1989. All SDT features emerged simul-
taneously: ages at first marriage, which had remained quite young during 
the preceding era, started increasing, premarital cohabitation rose, and so 
did proportions of extramarital births. In tandem with later union formation 
came a prolonged postponement of fertility at all ages and parities, leading to a 
precipitous drop of period fertility indicators. TFRs fell below 1.5 children and 
even below 1.3. A new term was coined: lowest-low fertility (Kohler, Billari, 
and Ortega 2002). Period fertility measures evidently can be deeply depressed 
when such systematic postponement occurs. However, the degree to which 
recovery can occur in cohort fertility is still uncertain, as is the amount of 
recovery in prospective period TFR levels. But the outcome seems to be that 
fertility will stay well below replacement in any event. In 2002, all former 
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Communist countries still had TFRs below 1.35, and as low as 1.10 (Ukraine). 
The sole exceptions were Albania, with a TFR probably around 2.0, and the 
Republic of Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro, with levels around 1.75.
Few observers in the former Communist countries initially thought 
that this could be the start of a second demographic transition. The older 
generation of demographers was highly skeptical about the SDT concept to 
start with, and remained convinced that these pronounced marriage and 
fertility postponements were exclusively the consequence of the economic 
crisis. The UN Economic Commission for Europe initially held this view as 
well (UNECE 1999, 2000). And the transition to capitalism was indeed a 
painful one: the end of guaranteed life-long employment, a reduction in 
labor force activity rates for women, a steep drop in the standard of living, 
a decline in state support for families, a privatization of the housing sector, 
and in several countries also a highly visible rise in poverty. But there was 
also a countercurrent of younger demographers, mainly in Russia (Zakha-
rov and Ivanova 1996; Zakharov 1997) and especially the Czech Republic 
(Zeman, Sobotka, and Kantorova 2001; Rabusic 2001; Sobotka 2002), who 
thought that, the economic crisis notwithstanding, a second demographic 
transition could be in the making. In fact, by the late 1990s the economies 
of several of former Communist countries were recovering along with per 
capita incomes. But there was no return to earlier patterns of marriage, nor 
an end to fertility postponement. Also the steady rise in extramarital fertil-
ity, which had often started before 1989, continued and even accelerated 
(see Figure 1). Of 18 such countries, only five still had proportions of extra-














FIGURE 1   Proportion of extramarital births (percent), selected
European countries, 1950–2008
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marital births below 20 percent in 2002. At the upper tail of the distribution, 
four had already reached Northern European levels with proportions above 
40 percent (Council of Europe 2004). Fifteen years earlier, these countries 
had percentages between 3 and 15, and only the former East Germany 
stood out with 34 percent extramarital births in 1985. These rapid increases 
are admittedly also the result of the rise in proportions of first births in the 
declining total, but they undeniably indicate that childbearing within co-
habiting unions is spreading in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The verdict seems to be that the economic crisis had indeed destabilized 
the earlier demographic regime, but also that the SDT had been nascent before 
1990 and that is it developing further. In other words, the SDT is emerging 
in Central and Eastern Europe as a feature that is there to stay, just as in the 
West. Once more it is emerging as a salient characteristic of capitalist econo-
mies and of cultures that recognize the primacy of individual autonomy and 
that develop the higher-order needs.
Southern Europe
As I indicated earlier, the demographic patterns of Southern Europe, from 
Portugal to Greece, have been considered an exception to the theory of two 
successive demographic transitions. In fact, in one crucial respect these coun-
tries were not an exception at all, since their marriage and fertility postpone-
ments were even more pronounced than in Western and Northern Europe. 
The postponement started later than in the West, but its intensity was striking. 
Moreover, as was also true for a few Western European countries like Austria 
and to some degree Germany, cohort fertility patterns in Southern Europe 
scarcely exhibited signs of fertility recuperation after age 30 (Lesthaeghe 2001; 
Frejka and Calot 2001). This means not only that progression to the second 
or third child is rarer than in Northern and Western Europe, but also that in 
the younger female cohorts larger proportions—typically in excess of 20 per-
cent—will not experience parenthood at all. This combination of factors is a 
recipe for prolonged lowest-low fertility, rather than for a temporary dip and 
swift return to replacement level. Hence, seen from the fertility perspective, 
Southern Europe followed the postponement trends in nuptiality and fertility, 
and these countries are by no means exceptions to these core SDT features. 
What made the Southern European starting pattern of the SDT so ex-
ceptional when compared to their Northern neighbors was the absence of 
home leaving in favor of single living or premarital cohabitation. Young adults 
simply continued living with their parents for longer periods. Furthermore, 
marriage remained the predominant precondition for childbearing. In other 
words, one of the SDT features was missing. Persuasive explanations for this 
difference have been offered by Palomba (1995), Micheli (1996, 2000), and 
Dalla Zuanna (2002). The last author also directly refers to Reher’s (1998) 
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distinction between the historically “strong family system” of Southern Eu-
rope and the traditionally “weak family system” of Western and Northern 
Europe. 
In the weak family system, children can leave the parental household 
before marriage, and then they fend for themselves in an interim period 
prior to marriage. Historically, they became servants, apprentices, landless 
and/or seasonal agricultural laborers, industrial workers, soldiers, seamen, or 
clergymen. In contemporary Northern and Western Europe, welfare provi-
sions still favor this earlier independence through sufficient student housing, 
scholarships, student transportation subsidies, youth unemployment ben-
efits and employment programs, and even guaranteed minimum incomes 
for single persons older than 18  no longer living at home. The result is still 
earlier home leaving for independent living, sharing, or cohabiting. Greater 
gender equity fosters higher female employment rates, and vice versa. House-
hold standards of living are based on dual incomes, but women can take off 
periods of time for family reasons (e.g., maternity leave, optional leave for 
childrearing or caring for a sick partner or parent). Either or both partners 
can also opt for part-time employment, an option enhanced by labor market 
flexibility. Furthermore, this system is compatible with the shift toward ex-
pressive values and roles, and it creates less tension between self-fulfillment 
and parenthood. 
In the strong family system, familial ties and solidarity—even allegiance 
to family alliances, as in Southern Italy—are more persistent throughout 
life. Men and women only leave the parental family to marry, and sons can 
even bring their wives into the parental home. Men are looked after by their 
mothers and then immediately thereafter by their wives. Traditional gender 
roles persist and men shun housework. Family bonds continue to func-
tion throughout life, both between siblings (e.g., in business) and between 
generations. Older parents and relatives are still taken in by their children. 
Mediterranean societies furthermore developed their welfare provisions on 
the assumption that strong familial solidarity would persist, and very few 
provisions allow young adults to become economically more independent. 
In addition, housing falls largely within the private sector, and most couples 
want to become home-owners. The resulting high housing costs tend to retard 
the departure from home. Home leaving occurs much later than in Western 
and Northern Europe, and there is little cohabitation or childbearing among 
unmarried couples. Instead, young adults continue to live in their “gilded 
nests” provided by caring parents. And for women, motherhood also means 
dropping out of the labor force, not only because this is to be expected from a 
“good mother,” but also because child care facilities are scarce and returning 
to an earlier job is more difficult. Opportunity costs are increased as a con-
sequence of the persistence of traditional role patterns and inflexible labor 
markets. The ultimate outcome is what Dalla Zuanna calls “a Pyrrhic victory 
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of the strong family system,” because, paradoxically, it will eventually disap-
pear for lack of adaptive capacity and absence of children. 
But does history stop here? Will the Mediterranean demographic sys-
tem maintain this hitherto characteristic lack of alternative household types 
among younger adults? The presence of such households is not routinely 
flagged by European registration systems, hence we have to wait for special 
surveys (or an occasional census) to monitor changes in household forms. The 
European Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) of the early 1990s are outdated 
by now, because they reflect living arrangements of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The major exception is that most European countries still distinguish between 
births occurring within marriage and out of wedlock. From this informa-
tion we cannot infer the respective shares of extramarital births contributed 
by single mothers and by cohabiting couples. But, as the record has shown 
for most continental Western and Northern European countries, the larger 
share has gone to the latter. Hence, extramarital fertility provides a useful 
early indicator of progression to one of the later phases of the SDT, namely 
procreation within cohabitation.
After a long period at low levels, nonmarital fertility started a steady 
upward trend in Southern Europe. Portugal, which historically had a tradi-
tion of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility (cf. Livi-Bacci 1971) in its 
southern provinces, is the exception. Portugal had steadily increasing propor-
tions of extramarital births since the 1970s. And when compared to figures 
for Western European countries, the rise in extramarital births in Portugal 
predates the corresponding increase in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany 
(FRG), and Switzerland. Spain is a more classic example of a late start and 
from a lower level, but the Spanish trend now runs parallel to Portugal’s, and 
in 2002 Spain’s share of extramarital births was larger than Switzerland’s. 
Apparently, the Pyrenees and the strong family system were not as formidable 
an obstacle to the diffusion of the SDT as had been thought.
A few more surprises may be found in Southern Europe. The first is 
a steep and continuing increase in out-of-wedlock fertility in Malta, rising 
from 2  percent in 1990 to 15  percent in 2002. The second has been a steady 
increase in extramarital fertility in Italy. Starting from very low levels in the 
1960s, the figure has now reached 15 percent. Judging from this record, the 
family system in Italy may be stronger than in Portugal, Spain, or Malta, but 
it is clearly not unaffected by the SDT. In fact, Italy is now catching up with 
the most “conservative” country in Western Europe, Switzerland, which has 
widespread cohabitation but a low level of extramarital fertility, at 10  percent 
of all births. Results from the latest Italian census indicate that in 2000 cohabi-
tation was widespread in many northern areas, both rural (e.g., Aosta, Emilia-
Romagna) and urban (e.g., Milan). Third, the percentage of nonmarital births 
has also reached the 10 percent level in 2000 in the Republic of Macedonia. 
Finally, the last part of the Mediterranean “strong family belt,” that is, Greece 
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and Cyprus, also shows a rise in nonmarital births, although the levels are 
still too low to justify any firmer conclusion. The Eastern Mediterranean thus 
constitutes the last area to be affected by the second demographic transition. 
Compared to a decade ago, history has moved in the predicted direction in 
Southern Europe as well.
Western and Northern Europe
To end this section on the European diffusion of the SDT, I would like to point 
out that the process is not yet complete in Western and Northern Europe 
either. As the extramarital fertility indicator shows, proportions of births out 
of wedlock are still increasing in most countries considered in Figure 1, in-
cluding those with the highest incidence, namely Iceland, Sweden, Germany, 
Norway, and France. Apparently the prospect of 60 percent of all births be-
ing born outside marriage is a possibility for these vanguard countries. Yet, it 
should also be pointed out that there is a distinctly more conservative version 
of the Western European SDT in which single living, sharing, and cohabita-
tion have all become common, but where marriage is still connected to the 
transition to parenthood. The parenthood decision often comes first, and the 
marriage decision follows. In such situations extramarital fertility is also ris-
ing but more slowly and at lower levels. Good examples of this conservative 
variant are Switzerland, Germany, Belgium (mainly Flanders), and to some 
extent the Netherlands. Ireland, by contrast, seems to have made the jump 
from the more conservative category to the more advanced SDT category of 
countries. In fact, Ireland has already crossed the 30 percent level, whereas 
in 1980 it barely had 5 percent of births out of wedlock. 
Historical path dependency and growing 
heterogeneity in the pattern of the SDT
So far we have documented that the features of the SDT did not stop at the 
borders of Northern and Western Europe and that the new pattern began to 
thrive after the crisis of the early 1990s in former Communist Central and 
Eastern Europe. But in the meantime it has become increasingly evident that 
the mixture of SDT ingredients may vary widely depending on context. Sub-
stantial within-country and between-country contrasts can be found (e.g., 
Billari and Kohler 2004; Neels 2006; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; Sobotka 
2008; Lesthaeghe 2009), and the same holds between educational categories 
(e.g., Neels 2006, 2009). Obviously such variations reflect historical path 
dependency, and these play just as large a role in the unfolding of the SDT 
as they did in producing leads and lags during the first transition. Hence, the 
SDT theory should not be taken as a teleological grand script with a standard 
scenario. On the contrary, it is a more general narrative that leaves room for 
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many different sub-narratives, each of which is anchored to specific empiri-
cal evidence.
Dissociations between the rise of cohabitation and the 
postponement of parenthood
From the beginning of the SDT, countries have exhibited striking differences 
between the timing of the onset of the rise in premarital cohabitation and the 
onset of fertility postponement. In Western Europe, for instance, the two were 
timed rather closely together, but in Southern Europe there was a major lag 
of about 20 years, with rising cohabitation starting much later.
 Spatial dissociations within a given country are equally common. In the 
United States both state- and county-level characteristics of household forma-
tion first split along two dimensions: characteristics of young households (in-
dicators pertaining to teenage fertility, young single mothers, grandchildren in 
household) and an SDT dimension (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). Problems 
along the first dimension are a typical American feature associated with low 
education and poverty (with milder versions found in the UK and Australia 
as well). But when the American SDT dimension was examined more closely, 
two spatial sub-dimensions appeared: the North Atlantic states were most 
advanced with respect to postponement of fertility in the age group 20–29, 
with clear sub-replacement fertility among non-Hispanic whites, whereas in 
the vanguard with respect to cohabitation were the liberal Mountain states 
(Colorado, Arizona) and the Pacific states. Furthermore, postponement of 
marriage and fertility was strongly associated with high education levels for 
both sexes, whereas cohabitation was connected to higher proportions born 
abroad or out of state. At the other end of the distribution, middle and low 
levels of cohabitation remained closely correlated with earlier fertility in the 
prime childbearing ages and with higher non-teenage fertility in the South-
ern, Appalachian, and the conservative Mountain states (especially Utah and 
Idaho), and in the Great Plains. The overall image is that of a first set of states 
where the SDT has not yet taken off, a second set where both cohabitation 
and fertility postponement hold the middle ground, and a leading SDT set that 
splits into two groups depending on whether they are in the vanguard either 
of the postponement of parenthood or of the spread of cohabitation. 
A spatial analysis of Belgium (Neels 2006; Lesthaeghe 2009) at the level 
of arrondissements produced an even clearer picture. The rise of cohabita-
tion and out-of-wedlock fertility after 1970 mirrors the spatial continuity of 
the maps of the marital fertility decline and the rise of contraceptive practice 
during the first demographic transition (1880–1940), and they are an almost 
perfect correlate of secularization levels from 1860 through 1960. The map of 
fertility postponement after 1970, by contrast, bears no resemblance to this 
long historical secularization, but typically reflects levels of higher education 
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and employment among women. The latter feature is also strongly echoed in 
the micro-level data analyzed by Neels (2006, 2009), which show that bet-
ter-educated women have been the dominant postponers ever since World 
War II.
The partial dissociation between the new household forms and fertility 
postponement in the United States and the complete dissociation of these fea-
tures in the Belgian spatial pattern of the SDT point toward different causes. 
In both countries cohabitation spreads faster in more secularized areas and 
bears only a weak relationship to education levels and female labor force 
participation. Postponement of parenthood is more strongly associated with 
the latter structural factors. Within the framework of Coale’s “ready, willing, 
and able” paradigm, the limiting factor for the rise in cohabitation seems to 
be of the “willingness” type, meaning that it depends more strongly on moral 
acceptability and legitimacy rather than on the calculus of advantage. This 
is understandable since cohabitation initially ran counter to the prevailing 
moral and legal codes in many countries. The postponement of parenthood, 
by contrast, is less conditioned by moral objections and more responsive to 
material conditions, hence linked to structural factors associated with the 
“readiness” condition.
The strong connection between cohabitation and liberal values derives 
support not only from spatial analyses such as the ones just cited, but equally 
from individual-level data. That evidence, to be discussed briefly in the next 
section, draws on numerous empirical studies (see Lesthaeghe 2002 for an 
overview and citations). 
Value orientations and household choices:  
Micro-level evidence
The initial article on the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van 
de Kaa 1986) posited that the new living arrangements, and cohabitation in 
particular, were the expressions of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments 
of younger cohorts who held a more egalitarian world view and placed greater 
emphasis on expressive values. Also during the 1980s political scientists ana-
lyzed the correlates of Inglehart’s “post-materialist” orientation (Inglehart 
1990; van Rijsselt 1989). Both the Eurobarometer surveys in the EU and the 
three rounds of the European Values Studies (EVS) provided data for detailed 
empirical research on attitudes and values for various social groups, including 
those based on living arrangements (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995). Par-
ticularly the EVS data of the 1999–2000 round proved useful for study of the 
SDT, since for the first time questions about ever experiencing cohabitation or 
divorce were incorporated along with current household status. This meant 
that the large group of currently married respondents could be divided into 
those who did and did not experience cohabitation or divorce. These refine-
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ments allowed clear distinctions in values orientations (see Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn 2002; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004).
Also in the United States, statistical associations between living arrange-
ments and specific value orientations drew attention. It was realized not only 
that cohorts were steadily progressing to higher levels of “post-materialism” 
and secularism, but also that a recursive relationship existed between demo-
graphic choices and values orientation. As Thornton and colleagues showed 
(1985, 1992), greater secularism fostered choices in favor of premarital sex 
and non-traditional household formation patterns, but the latter also rein-
forced further secularization. In other words, a selection into various types 
of behavior occurred based on existing values, followed by an affirmation or 
strengthening of these values based on the behavioral choice. Clearly, the 
statistical associations between value orientations and the various types of 
households are merely the “footprints” of this ongoing process of selection 
followed by affirmation or negation of values. Panel data with values mea-
surements and transitions in household living arrangements are needed to 
disentangle the two directions of causation. American social scientists took 
the lead in organizing panel surveys, and it is mainly on the basis of these that 
the recursive model of selection/adaptation could be checked (e.g., Waite, 
Goldscheider, and Witsberger 1986; Axinn and Thornton 1993; Barber 2001; 
Clarkberg 2002). More recently, a few European panel surveys measure vari-
ous value orientations at successive waves, and they too lend themselves to 
disentangling the causal components of the recursive relationship (e.g., Moors 
1997; Jansen and Kalmijn 2002).
The outcomes of analyses of these cross-sectional and panel data can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) Secular, egalitarian, and anti-authoritarian orientations, expressive 
values, and values stressing individual autonomy are strong predictors of life 
courses that include “unconventional” states such as premarital cohabita-
tion and parenthood among cohabitors. These effects are net of structural 
effects linked to education, socioeconomic status, employment, or degree of 
urbanness. 
2) Cohabitants without children tend to exhibit the extreme non-con-
formist values profile, including greater gender symmetry, less intolerance to 
all types of minorities, greater protest-proneness, but also greater tolerance 
for breaches of civil morality.
3) Marriage and parenthood are associated with major readjustments of 
value orientations in the conventional and conformist direction.
4) Married parents who never cohabited display by far the most con-
servative attitudes.
5) Any earlier cohabitation experience leaves a more permanent imprint 
in the non-conformist direction, even after marriage and parenthood have 
been achieved.
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6) Divorce produces a departure from the stability of conventional opin-
ions held by married parents.5
I note, finally, that these associations at the micro level are found 
throughout Europe. They hold just as well in countries that have progressed 
far along the SDT as in those that are recent starters.
Fertility and the SDT: Postponement and recuperation
The typical explanation for the fertility decline associated with the SDT is the 
postponement of parenthood and the shifting of fertility to older ages. This 
explanation is reflected in the Bongaarts–Feeney (1998) formula used to 
upwardly correct the current period total fertility rate (PTFR) for this tempo 
shift. In this expression, however, the authors have no room for differential 
subsequent recuperation of postponed births. They use the standard assump-
tion of adjusting current period parity-specific TFRs (PTFRi) and inflating 
these by the complement of the annual rate of parity-specific postponement 
observed in the last few years. Reality is a bit more complicated. Not only is 
the rate of postponement variable over time, but the European experience 
clearly shows a great deal of heterogeneity in the amount of recovery of 
fertility at later ages. This is most clearly shown in the comparison of cohort 
fertility profiles, either parity-specific or for all parities combined. 
On the one hand, there are countries where each cohort postpones 
childbearing longer than its predecessor, but where the ultimate fertility 
(i.e., the cohort total fertility rate, or CTFR) is fairly constant, because of the 
recuperation at older ages of almost all postponed births. The Netherlands 
is a typical example of this outcome, but it also holds for the Scandinavian 
countries, France, and Belgium. Also, period TFRs in these countries will 
bounce back when the tempo shift stops. On the other hand are cases where 
such recuperation is absent or modest, and where cohort TFRs continue fall-
ing as long as the postponement continues. Moreover, these cohort TFRs will 
remain well below replacement level. Typical examples of this pattern are the 
Mediterranean countries and the German-speaking populations of Western 
Europe (cf. Lesthaeghe 2001; Frejka and Sardon 2004; Sobotka 2004, 2008). 
For the former Communist countries, differential recovery may now be ob-
servable too. These countries experienced their major postponement trend 
during the 1990s, and couples who were then in their early 20s are now old 
enough to exhibit the presence or absence of such a correction at later ages. 
The bottom line here is that initial differences in period TFRs among European 
populations were indeed largely due to differential rates of postponement, 
but that differential recuperation will now increasingly determine the period 
TFRs during the first two decades of the twenty-first century (Sowers and 
Lesthaeghe 2008). The degree to which this recuperation will occur depends 
on varying historical and current circumstances and policy measures.
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At the time of the original formulation of the SDT theory, the systematic 
postponement of marriages and first births was already underway in West-
ern Europe. Van de Kaa and I predicted that the new cultural shifts toward 
the expressive needs in tandem with increased individual autonomy would 
sustain this demographic tempo shift. The outcome would be “structural” 
sub-replacement fertility instead of cyclically oscillating fertility around re-
placement level. At that time, we did not predict the coming of lowest-low 
fertility or period TFRs below 1.3 children, nor were we able to differenti-
ate between strong and weak recuperation. The latter feature would only 
gain our attention more than a decade later (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; 
Lesthaeghe 2001) and independently from the SDT theory.
Nevertheless, van de Kaa (2002) and Sobotka (2008) showed that the 
SDT was indeed a good predictor of postponement, capable of neatly align-
ing countries along a positive slope: the higher the level of Inglehart post-
materialism (van de Kaa) or the higher the composite index of SDT values 
(Sobotka), the higher the mean age of women at first birth or the earlier the 
onset of fertility postponement. To elucidate this point, I reproduce the origi-












































































FIGURE 2   Relationship between the mean age at first birth around 1998 
and the Inglehart index of postmaterialism in 1990
SOURCE: van de Kaa (2002).
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When the same exercise is repeated for period TFRs, the original SDT/
postponement relationship vanishes, and a positive correlation emerges 
when total fertility is connected to the SDT values index,6 as shown by 
Sobotka in Figure 4. By 2000 the countries with high SDT values had by 
far the highest period fertility levels in Europe, and some had come very 
close to replacement level.7 None of them ever fell below a period TFR of 
1.5, and by 2007 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the UK, 
France, and Ireland all had period TFRs above 1.8 (Prioux 2008). The posi-
tive relationship with the SDT values index in Figure 4 is in fact the result of 
“split correlation” and is produced by two distinct scatters. The collection of 
cases on the right side corresponds to countries with an early start in fertility 
postponement and a strong recuperation of fertility forgone at earlier ages. 
The cases on the left side with much lower period TFRs are mainly cases 
where postponement started later and recuperation of fertility was weak 
(German-speaking populations, Southern European countries, and most 
formerly Communist countries). 
For the SDT theory to be relevant for the twenty-first-century fertility 
differentials in Europe, it needs to incorporate explanations for differential 
recuperation as well. With the benefit of hindsight it seems that certain 
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FIGURE 3   Relationship between a composite index of SDT values 
in 1999–2000 and the date of onset of the postponement of first births
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parenthood and hence tended to lower period fertility levels, whereas other 
aspects have facilitated a more complete recuperation, thereby returning 
period TFRs to higher levels. I will now seek to clarify these opposite effects 
with reference to the factors sketched in Figure 5.
On the postponement side I place social and economic factors associated 
with prolonged education and longer preparation for careers in deregulated 
and globalizing labor markets. However, to these “mechanical” (e.g., pro-
longed formal education) or structural factors can be added cultural features 
such as greater aspirations for self-realization, a greater tendency to keeping 
an open future, or higher consumption and leisure aspirations. The former 
are typical structural features of post-industrial societies, whereas the latter 
are more closely connected to the expressive values orientations. Together 
these two sets of factors have a negative effect on fertility operating via their 
postponement effect.
Subsequent recuperation of fertility, on the other hand, may be consid-
erably enhanced by factors that facilitate the combining of work and parent-
hood for women and men or that alleviate the opportunity costs of parent-
hood and family building. A further distinction can be made by referring 
to (i) historical household patterns and gender relations (e.g., the contrast 
between the strong and weak family types, existence of neolocal marriage or 














































































FIGURE 4   Relationship between a composite index of SDT values 
in 1999–2000 and 2004 period total fertility rates
SOURCE: Sobotka (2008, p. 52).
Weak recuperation
and/or late start
Early start to postponement + 
strong recuperation
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magnitude of welfare provisions (e.g., child allowances, parenthood leave, 
work interruptions for family reasons) and other organizational features 
(e.g., school opening hours and day care provision). These structural features 
equally have to be seen in interaction with value orientations connected to 
self-reliance of young adults (and of men in particular) and to gender sym-
metry in daily life. The separate impact of each of these factors is not easy to 
assess, but when taken together substantial differences in patterns of fertil-
ity recuperation can result. In fact, the “split correlation” noticed in Figure 
4 may in part be due to national contrasts in this respect. Just focusing on 
Western and Southern European countries, for instance, Thévenon (2009) 
notes striking differences in factors that alleviate time pressure on parents 
of young children. Not surprisingly, all countries with higher fertility levels 
resulting from strong recuperation have better-adapted services and much 
longer opening hours of facilities (services de garde) for infants and toddlers, for 
preschool children in kindergarten, and for children in primary school. 
To conclude, the original formulation of the SDT theory predicted— ap-
parently correctly—a long period of below-replacement fertility, but it did 
not predict the current discrepancy between levels close to replacement and 
levels far below it. The current heterogeneity in Europe is indeed due to dif-
ferences in the timing of the onset of fertility postponement, but increasingly 
also it is the result of differences in the degree of fertility rebounding at older 



















234  T H E  U N F O L D I N G  S T O R Y  O F  T H E  S E C O N D  D E M O G R A P H I C  T R A N S I T I O N
opposite directions: some foster postponement and hence lower fertility, while 
others support greater recuperation of fertility. The weight of context-specific 
features, both of a historical and an organizational nature, is again consider-
able, and consequently SDT sub-narratives are necessary to encompass that 
diversity. 
Can the SDT spread to non-Western 
populations?
It is widely accepted that the first demographic transition is a worldwide 
phenomenon. Everyone also realizes that the first transition can begin at 
just about any level of economic development, and in strictly rural as well 
as urban societies. But will the second demographic transition be equally 
universal? Or, as Coleman expects, will it remain a regional idiosyncrasy? 
Obviously, at this stage we can only speculate about the probabilities of such 
a universal diffusion, in the same way that one could only speculate in the 
1950s and 1960s about the eventuality of pervasive fertility control emerging 
in the then-developing countries. However, if we are looking for evidence of 
the second demographic transition beyond the European cultural sphere but 
in countries wealthy enough to have undergone some Maslowian drift, we 
may indeed find suitable testing grounds. Several industrialized and urban-
ized Asian countries are therefore of direct relevance.
Before considering the detailed evidence, one should be reminded that 
identification of the SDT requires the presence of several features: 
1) Sub-replacement fertility must be linked to postponement of mar-
riage and childbearing.
2) Ages at marriage must reflect a growing prominence of free partner 
choice and female autonomy.
3) Premarital cohabitation must become more common and more widely 
acceptable.
4) At both the macro level and the individual level, connections must 
exist between demographic features and value orientations.
Note, however, that the demographic characteristics of the SDT do not 
necessarily occur simultaneously, but that lags are likely to emerge. Premarital 
cohabitation and parenthood among cohabitors, for instance, typically consti-
tute lagging features, since they often run counter to existing moral codes.
Sub-replacement fertility and postponement  
in Asian industrialized countries
The criterion of a shift toward later parenthood and sub-replacement fertil-
ity is the easiest to assess since national demographic statistics provide clear 
evidence on the course of period and cohort fertility. Japan, South Korea, 
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Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore all have very low period TFRs at present. 
Hong Kong’s period TFR is around 1.0, Singapore’s is a marginally higher 
1.1, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan are in the 1.15–1.25 range (CIA data base 
2008). In all cases these lowest-low fertility levels are the result of widespread 
postponement with little or no recuperation of fertility at later ages. Obvi-
ously, there is some recuperation of first births, but this is offset by further 
declines at higher parities (see inter alia Zhang 2005; Jones, Straughan, and 
Chan 2009; Tsuya 2009; Frejka and Sardon 2009).
The extent of fertility postponement and the weak impact of recupera-
tion in the lowest-low East Asian countries are seen in the trend in cohort 
cumulated fertility up to age 27, which is illustrative of postponement, and 
in cohort cumulated fertility between ages 27 and 40, which is illustrative of 
recuperation. The evolution of cumulated fertility up to age 27 is presented in 
Figure 6, and that for ages 27 to 40 in Figure 7. In these figures, I have selected 
three countries with early postponement but strong recuperation (France, 
Netherlands, Sweden), three European countries with weak recuperation 
(Austria, Italy, and Spain), and four East Asian countries (Japan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Taiwan).
Figure 6 illustrates that the four Asian countries exhibit the same fertility 
postponement trend as found in the European countries. In fact, Hong Kong 
had massive postponement for the cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, 
whereas Taiwan and South Korea have a fast postponement tempo for the 
FIGURE 6   Cumulated cohort fertility up to age 27, selected countries, 
1940–1980 birth cohorts





































SOURCE: Frejka and Sardon (2009: Appendix 3).
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cohorts born after 1965. Also note that the Hong Kong, Japanese, and Korean 
cohorts born in 1980 have fewer than 40 children per 100 women born before 
age 27. With these figures they match the levels of Spain and Italy.
Figure 7 shows the trends in fertility in the age range 27–40, a period 
during which recovery could be expected to occur. Not surprisingly, the clear-
est fertility increase and the highest fertility levels are found in the Northern 
and Western European examples used here, whereas Hong Kong has a con-
tinued fall in its older-age fertility, and Japan exhibits a reversal from a slight 
recovery to further postponement. This lends support to the speculation that 
the East Asian populations are following a “Mediterranean pattern,” with 
rapid postponement and little recuperation at older ages, thereby sustaining 
a period fertility level that falls within the lowest-low category (for Taiwan 
and Hong Kong see Tu and Zhang 2004).
The Asian marriage revolution
Many populations in East Asia, not only those of industrialized countries, 
have witnessed a sharp increase in the mean ages at marriage for both sexes. 
The “marriage revolution” that Goode was forecasting in the 1960s emerged 
in full force between 1970 and 2000, as illustrated in Table 1 by the percent-
ages of women single at ages 30–34 and 40–44. In 2000 more than a quarter 
of all women aged 30–34 were still single in Japan and Myanmar, and about 
FIGURE 7   Cumulated cohort fertility at ages 27–40, selected countries, 
1940–1965 birth cohorts 




































SOURCE: Frejka and Sardon (2009: Appendix 4).
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a fifth were not yet married among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia. 
Probably more recent figures for women in Thailand will come close to a fifth 
as well. Moreover, percentages single for men are typically higher than for 
women. For instance, in Japan in 2004, a third of men aged 30–34 were still 
unmarried. The classic correlates are again increasing proportions of men and 
women with more schooling, with employment outside agriculture and other 
domestic industries, less employment security, and much smaller proportions 
accepting arranged marriages. If, according to Jones (2004), current Western 
European figures of proportions single were corrected to exclude proportions 
cohabiting, then several Asian populations would exceed Europeans in pro-
portions “effectively single.” 
Equally classic is that the postponement of parenthood follows in the 
wake of rising ages at marriage, particularly when out-of-wedlock fertility 
is low. However, shotgun marriages and births in the first eight months of 
marriage may become more frequent, as is already true for Japan (Tsuya 
2006; Raymo, Iwasawa, and Bumpass 2008). For instance, the 2004 Gender 
and Generation Survey revealed that 28 percent of Japanese married women 
aged 25–29 had a premarital conception, and that the figure was 26 percent 
in the age group 30–34. By contrast, older generations, those above age 55 
in 2004, had figures in the range of 4 to 7 percent (Tsuya 2006). Evidently, 
premarital births are still rare in East Asian societies, but premarital concep-
tions and shotgun marriages are not.
The Japanese shift during the late 1970s and 1980s in partnership for-
mation patterns can be gleaned from the data collected in the early 1990s. 
Table 2 reproduces 1992 figures pertaining to the union formation status 
at various ages for successive cohorts of women. At any given age percent-
ages married drop. By contrast, the percentages with “no event” increase for 
TABLE 1 Increases in percentages of never-married women between 
1970 and 2000, ages 30–34 and 40–44, selected Asian populations
 30–34  40–44
Population 1970 2000 1970 2000
Japan 7.2 26.6 5.3 8.6
Myanmar 9.3 25.9 6.2 14.8
Thailand 8.1 16.1 3.9 9.3
Singapore—Chinese 11.1 21.6 3.6 15.0
Singapore—Malays 3.9 12.2 1.7 8.2
Malaysia—Chinese 9.5 18.2 3.4 8.4
Malaysia—Malays 3.3 9.7 1.1 4.4
Philippines 8.9 14.8 6.0 7.1
South Korea 1.4 10.7 0.2 2.6
Indonesia 2.2 6.9 1.2 2.4
SOURCE: Jones (2004: Appendix Table 1).
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younger cohorts, showing that more of them experienced a longer period of 
being “really single.” Equally striking is that the percentages who had met a 
partner by ages 20 and 25, but were not married or engaged, are also increas-
ing. The table does not reveal the precise form of behavior of these younger 
unmarried women who had met a partner, and at that time my Japanese col-
leagues all assumed that these couples would occasionally meet in hotels or 
other such places, but would not be cohabiting. In fact, in Tokyo seminars as 
late as 2002 it was believed that premarital cohabitation simply did not occur 
in Japan. That assumption proved to be false as two independently organized 
surveys in the early twenty-first century indicated.
Just as in the Mediterranean countries, premarital cohabitation in Japan 
only emerged with a substantial time lag compared to the other hallmarks of 
the SDT. But initially it went unnoticed because no survey bothered to probe 
into the matter. In 2004, however, the first round of Japan’s “Gender and 
Generations Survey” revealed that a fifth of all women and men aged 25–29, 
irrespective of their current status, had ever experienced cohabitation. Older 
women aged 40–44 in 2004 also reported figures above 10 percent. Table 3 
gives the results in greater detail.
The other Japanese survey, organized by the Mainichi Shimbun News-
paper in 2004, confirms the appreciable prevalence of premarital cohabita-
TABLE 2 Union formation status (percent) in 1992 at specific ages 
for birth cohorts of Japanese women
 No Met   Number 
Age and birth cohort event partner Engaged Married of cases
By age 20
1950–54 64 21 5 10 2,137
1955–59 66 22 5 7 1,923
1960–64 66 24 3 6 1,915
1965–69 72 20 3 5 1,962
1970–74 62 34 0 4 1,046
By age 25
1950–54 21 6 5 68 2,137
1955–59 24 10 4 62 1,923
1960–64 30 11 6 53 1,915
1965–69 33 18 3 46 947
By age 30
1950–54 8 1 1 90 2,137
1955–59 10 2 2 86 1,923
1960–64 12 6 1 82 961
By age 35
1950–54 6 1 1 93 2,137
1955–59 6 2 1 91 987
SOURCE: Japanese National Fertility survey 1992; H. Matsuo (2001: Appendix Table 11).
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tion, but, more crucially, reveals that this is not simply a short-term event. 
As Table 4 shows, the mean duration of premarital cohabitation reported by 
women is close to two years.
The conclusion from the data presented so far is that Japan is no longer 
an exception to major characteristics of the SDT. Add to that the rise in pre-
marital conceptions and the divorce rate, and it becomes clear that Japan is 
by now definitely experiencing a second demographic transition in which the 
concepts of partnership and marriage are being redefined. The only missing 
ingredient so far is parenthood among cohabiting couples.
Moreover, Japan is not just a single outlier in East Asia. Based on two 
KAP (“knowledge, attitude, and practice”) surveys held in Taiwan, Li-Shou 
TABLE 3 Percent of Japanese women and men of all marital statuses 
reporting ever having cohabited, Gender and Generations Survey, 2004
 Women  Men  Both sexes
Age % N % N % N
20–24 11.7 322 11.0 243 11.4 565
25–29 20.2 352 20.6 289 20.4 641
30–34 16.5 345 20.6 296 18.6 641
35–39 15.7 602 15.9 472 15.8 1,074
40–44 11.5 456 15.5 400 13.5 856
45–49 7.5 504 10.7 418 9.1 922
50–54 7.0 558 12.1 523 9.5 1,081
55–59 5.4 527 8.3 492 6.9 1,019
60–64 4.4 535 9.5 498 6.9 1,033
65–69 2.1 425 5.0 489 3.7 914
Total 10.0 4,626 12.6 4,120 14.6 8,746
NOTE: Percentages are computed, using sample and response rate weights. 
SOURCE: Tsuya (2006: Table 1).
TABLE 4 Percent of Japanese women who have ever cohabited 
by birth cohort, mean duration, and percent followed by marriage, 
Mainichi Shimbun Group 2004
  Mean duration Percent of completed 
 Prevalence of of cohabiting cohabiting unions  
Birth cohort cohabitation (%) unions (months) resulting in marriage
1954–59 10 22 64
1960–64 10 21 70
1965–69 17 26 62
1970–74 21 20 61
1975–79 21 21 40
1980–84 10 16 44
Total 15 21 58
SOURCE: Raymo, Iwasawa, and Bumpass (2008).
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Yang found that premarital cohabitation is on the rise in that country (see 
Table 5). If the figures for the 2004 KAP survey for married women could 
have been broken down into smaller age categories, then the incidence of 
premarital cohabitation for married women aged 25–29 would almost cer-
tainly have exceeded 25 percent, even higher than the corresponding Japa-
nese figure. 
Finally, there is also evidence for the existence of cohabitation in the 
Philippines (Guerrero 1995; Jones 2005), but it is not yet clear whether this 
is a much older form of consensual union or actual premarital cohabitation.
The empirical evidence on cohabitation for other industrialized or urban 
Asian societies is missing, again because it is simply taken for granted that 
its incidence is close to zero. As was the case for Mediterranean and former 
Communist Europe in the 1990s, this belief lasts until someone inserts the 
“ever cohabited” question in a survey. It appears that insertion of such a 
question is overdue in China, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, at 
the very least.8 
Value orientations and the timing of parenthood: 
Micro-level evidence for three Asian populations
Several Asian countries participated in one or two rounds of the World Val-
ues Survey, which were shortened versions of their older European counter-
parts. These surveys are again a major source of information on seculariza-
tion, civil and sexual morality, expressive values at work and in educating 
children, political features such as post-materialism, protest-proneness, and 
trust in institutions, and values regarding gender relations. Information on 
demographic characteristics for Asia is limited to the number of children in 
the household and current marital status. No questions on current or previ-
ous cohabitation or on divorce were inserted. This means that these Asian 
surveys can only be used to check whether later ages at parenthood are cor-
related with the same SDT values indicators as in the West: more egalitarian 
gender relations, accentuation of non-material benefits in work, stress on 
autonomy and imagination in educating children, higher post-materialism 
scores on the Inglehart scales, greater protest-proneness, greater distrust of 
TABLE 5 Percent of women aged 20–49 who have ever cohabited, 
Taiwan KAP surveys of 1998 and 2004, by current marital status
 KAP 1998  KAP 2004
Current marital status % N % N
Unmarried 7.8 731 15.3 1,200
Married 12.6 2,262 21.6 2,752
Total 11.4 2,993 19.6 3,952
SOURCE: Li-Shou Yang, personal communication.
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institutions, less weight given to religion, and greater tolerance for breaches 
in civil and sexual morality.
The data files of the World Values Surveys also had to be pooled for 
Japan 1995 and 2000, and for South Korea 1994 and 2001 to obtain more 
than 600 female respondents aged 18–45. For Singapore there was only one 
survey round. In all countries childlessness was predicted on the basis of age 
(5 categories), education (3 categories: lower secondary, higher secondary, 
tertiary), occupational status (5 categories: professional, other white collar, 
blue collar, student, housewife), and one value item per regression. Analysis 
is conducted using binary logistic regression, and the results for all value items 
(available on request from the author) are given in the form of exponentiated 
regression coefficients after controlling for the other covariates. Table 6 in-
dicates the number of such coefficients with net effects on childlessness in 
the expected direction. For instance, in Japan, 15 of the 16 items related to 
gender issues had the expected net effect (conformist for earlier parenthood, 
non-conformist for later parenthood).
Table 6 shows that not all items were present in the surveys of the three 
countries: Japan contributed 70 items, Korea only 56. The tallies of coeffi-
cients for all three countries show that more than 80 percent of them are in 
the expected direction, indicating an overwhelming concordance with what 
is found in the West (cf. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004): non-conformist or 
more libertarian attitudes correctly predict postponement of parenthood. 
The only exception encountered in these analyses pertains to the religion 
and secularization items in Japan. Here only four of the ten items are in the 
expected direction. 
I conclude that individual-level data from three advanced Asian econo-
mies demonstrate that the demographic dimension of postponement of par-
TABLE 6 Link between later parenthood and sets of value 
orientations: Number of items with net effects in the expected 
direction, women aged 18–45 (after controls for age, education, and 
occupational status)
 Japan South Korea Singapore 
 1995, 2000 1994, 2001 2002
Family and gender items 15 of 16 15 of 16 13 of 16
Socialization traits 7 of 9 9 of 9 7 of 9
Work characteristics 5 of 5 na 9 of 10
Political orientation 19 of 20 17 of 19 7 of 9
Ethics and morality issues 8 of 10 7 of 9 9 of 9
Religion and secularization 4 of 10 2 of 3 9 of 10
Total 58 of 70 50 of 56 54 of 63
Total percent 83 89 86
SOURCE: Computed by the author from World Values Surveys Data Files, ISR Michigan.
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enthood can be linked to the same value orientations as those associated with 
the SDT in Europe. Further checks and stronger evidence would be welcome, 
and for a start this requires the insertion of simple questions concerning prior 
cohabitation and divorce along with the question on current marital status. This 
minor alteration of the World Values Surveys questionnaire and other surveys 
would make a considerable contribution to further empirical work pertaining 
to the Asian patterns indicative of the second demographic transition.
Discussion
Before answering the questions posed at the onset, I make a preliminary 
point in order to avoid subsequent misunderstanding about the role of cul-
ture in the second demographic transition. The SDT theory fully recognizes 
the effects of macro-level structural changes and of micro-level economic 
calculus. But it does not consider these explanations as sufficient, but merely 
as necessary or non-redundant. By the same token, cultural explanations are 
necessary but not sufficient. Also, the SDT theory does not consider cultural 
change as endogenous to any economic model, but as a necessary additional 
force with its own exogenous effects on demographic outcomes. Culture is 
treated as a dynamic set of value orientations. These orientations can change 
at the individual level, and they can be linked recursively to the unfolding of 
the life course. They can also change at the collective level during particular 
periods of time, or shift to new configurations with the succession of cohorts. 
The Maslowian drift to higher-order needs is positively related to economic 
growth, but other factors reflecting historical path dependency (often in re-
ligious and political spheres) modulate this connection.
With these remarks in mind, I now turn to the questions posed in the 
introduction.
Is the SDT merely a continuation of the first transition?
The second demographic transition differs significantly from the first transition 
both in terms of demographic predictions and in terms of underlying motiva-
tions. Because the SDT predicts generalized sub-replacement fertility in tandem 
with a greater plurality of living arrangements and household structures, it also 
points to the growing importance of international migration. Furthermore, 
the SDT predictions depart from the benign equilibrium outcomes of the first 
transition, such as a stationary population, not much need for migration, and 
the predominance of the stable conjugal family. By contrast, sustained sub-
replacement fertility will accelerate population aging and put a strain on wel-
fare systems. Such low fertility will also stimulate replacement migration as a 
means of countering labor force shortages. In addition, some of the new living 
arrangements may be more unstable than traditional arrangements, or may be 
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less adequate as a setting for procreation and socialization. Union dissolution 
will remain a major cause of low fertility as well. 
Did the SDT spread beyond Northern and  
Western Europe?
Here, the answer is definitely affirmative. The SDT did not stop at the Pyr-
enees or Alps, but crossed into Central and Eastern Europe as well. All of 
these areas witnessed a rise in the share of extramarital births, which clearly 
points in the direction of new contexts of procreation, such as cohabitation 
and single parenthood. Equally striking is the finding that the individual 
value profiles according to living arrangement were similar across all parts 
of Europe. 
Were the demographic changes since 1990 in Central 
and Eastern Europe mainly the outcome of transition 
to a market economy?
The economic crisis of the early 1990s in Eastern and Central Europe was pro-
pitious for the postponement of marriages and births, and hence for the dip to 
very low levels of fertility. But a purely crisis-based explanation is untenable. 
First, much of the crisis has long since ended in countries such as Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary, where GDP per capita has risen to levels higher 
than in the 1980s, yet we have seen no return to earlier age at marriage or 
higher fertility. Instead, cohabitation and procreation outside marriage are 
spreading. Second, the SDT seems to advance faster in countries with more 
successful economic and political performance, which is again indicative of 
the importance of factors other than those associated with the economic 
crisis. Major structural and cultural factors promoted the sustained diffusion 
of the SDT. On the structural side, for instance, the post-Communist era has 
been characterized by expanding female education in several of these coun-
tries, and this has definitely contributed to the postponement of marriages 
and births (e.g., Kantorova 2004). Similarly, the rise of individual autonomy 
and freedom of choice has legitimized the adoption of nontraditional living 
arrangements in a very short time. These features will not be reversed easily, 
hence the SDT in Central and Eastern Europe will continue on its course as 
in Western and Northern Europe. 
Are the various demographic ingredients of the SDT 
performing as a cohesive whole?
Multiple variants of the SDT have emerged. At one end of the scale, North-
ern and Western European populations experienced early development of 
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nonconventional household formation patterns and early emergence of 
parenthood postponement, but they have maintained higher levels of sub-
replacement fertility as recuperation at later ages of first and second births 
was substantial. At the other end are later “postponers” but with much 
weaker recuperation in overall fertility, and hence a pattern of lowest-low 
fertility in its third decade. Similarly, both the timing and the spatial pat-
terns of cohabitation and fertility postponement can be disjunct. Time lags 
between these two aspects of the SDT vary widely, and spatial correspon-
dence between them can be weak or absent. Finally, the values associated 
with the SDT represent a cohesive package when it comes to their effects 
on parenthood postponement, but not where recuperation is concerned. 
In fact, at a later stage in the life cycle, greater gender symmetry and more 
developed services aimed at reducing opportunity costs of childbearing to 
working women seem to be linked to greater recuperation of fertility and 
consequently to higher levels of period fertility. 
Can the SDT spread to other continents  
and non-European societies?
It has clearly been shown that the SDT can spread beyond Western societies. 
At this point it appears that several advanced Asian populations have joined 
the set of SDT countries, since all characteristics except one (procreation 
among cohabitants) have emerged. Moreover, the micro-level data for Japan, 
South Korea, and Singapore are consistent with value orientations commonly 
found in European countries.
Admittedly it will remain difficult to separate the effects of structural 
factors and ideational factors on marriage postponement and low fertility. 
Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that mass media are producing a 
“world culture” in which individual autonomy and self-actualization have a 
prominent, if not dominant place, and that these provide both motivations 
and justifications for the onset of the SDT. Political, religious, and ideological 
backlashes are of course always possible (e.g., Christian and Muslim funda-
mentalist reactions), but to this point such reactions have not been sufficient 
to cause a decisive retreat from SDT values in countries with democratic 
governance. 
Several decades of experience in countries as distinct from each other as 
Sweden and Japan have revealed the diversity of SDT development paths and 
the existence of historical and cultural reasons for such heterogeneity. But 
despite such distinctions, an important set of SDT predictions still holds: 
1) The normative and institutional bases of traditional union forma-
tion and household structure will systematically weaken in all societies that 
adopt egalitarian and democratic systems governed by respect for individual 
choice. This prediction implies that other forms of union formation will ex-
R O N  L E S T H A E G H E  245
pand in the wake of such ideational developments. The political evolution of 
countries is thus at least as crucial for the onset of the SDT as their economic 
circumstances. 
2) Alongside individual autonomy, self-realization will become a major 
goal in its own right. This will produce a rising demand for higher education, 
especially among women, stimulate other tastes and life styles, and result in 
sub-replacement fertility.
3) Communication technology and mass media are spreading knowledge 
about new forms of behavior to all corners of the world. Moreover, new forms 
of behavior are associated by the public itself with being “more advanced” and 
“more developed” (Thornton 2005). Just as the first demographic transition in 
many developing countries benefited from this communication revolution, so 
will the diffusion of the second transition be enhanced by global communica-
tion and by the power of what Thornton calls “developmental idealism.” 
4) Fundamentalist reactions are likely to occur in response to these 
global ideational shifts, but so far their success has been too limited to stem 
the overall shift toward post-materialist and expressive value orientations. In 
short, such reactions might slow the diffusion of the SDT or produce marked 
spatial differences, but they cannot stem the tide altogether.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 Overview of demographic and societal characteristics  
related to the  first and second demographic transitions in Western Europe
First transition Second transition
Marriage 
Rise in proportions marrying, declining Fall in proportions married,  
age at first marriage rise in age at first marriage
Low or reduced cohabitation Rise in cohabitation (pre- and postmarital) 
Low divorce Rise in divorce, earlier divorce
High remarriage Decline in remarriage following both divorce 
 and widowhood
Fertility
Decline in marital fertility via   Further decline in fertility via postponement, 
reductions at older ages, lowering    increasing mean age at first parenthood, 
mean ages at childbearing structural sub-replacement fertility
Deficient contraception, parity   Efficient contraception (exceptions in  
failures specific social groups)
Declining illegitimate fertility, but not  Rising extramarital fertility due to  
necessarily among teenage women parenthood within cohabitation
Low definitive childlessness among  Rising definitive childlessness in unions 
married couples
Societal background
Preoccupations with basic material needs:  Rise of higher-order needs: individual  
income, work conditions, housing, health,  autonomy, self-actualization, expressive 
schooling, social security; solidarity is   work and socialization values, grassroots 
prime value democracy, recognition by others; tolerance  
 is prime valueRising memberships in political, civic, 
 Disengagement from civic and community- and community-oriented networks; 
  oriented networks, social capital shifts to  strengthening of social cohesion
 expressive and affective types; weakening  
 of social cohesion
Strong normative regulation by Church
  Retreat of the state, second secularization  
and State; first secularization wave,
  wave, sexual revolution, refusal of authority, 
dominance of political and social 
 waning influence of political factions  
factions (“pillars”)
 (“pillars”)
Segregated gender roles, familistic policies,
  Rising symmetry in gender roles, female  
embourgeoisement, promotion of 
 economic autonomy 
breadwinner family model
Ordered life-course transitions, prudent 
 




model of the family
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Figures 1, 6, and 7 in this article are avail-
able in color in the electronic edition of the 
journal.
This essay was first presented at the con-
ference on “Fertility in the History of the 20th 
Century—Trends, Theories, Public Discourses, 
and Policies,” Academia Leopoldina & Berlin-
Brandenburgische Akademie, Berlin, 21–23 
January 2010. The author thanks Tomas 
Frejka and Arland Thornton for comments.
1 It should be noted that most demog-
raphers writing during the interbellum fore-
casted a sustained period of sub-replacement 
fertility and did not take a stationary popu-
lation as a transition endpoint (cf. Demeny 
1997; Van Bavel 2010). In reality, only a few 
countries (mainly Germany, Sweden, and 
England) had a period TFR declining below 2 
children for any length of time, and by the end 
of the 1930s all had rising TFR values. Other 
countries such as the Netherlands, Canada, 
and Italy never had TFRs below 2.5 children 
during the entire interbellum period. In addi-
tion, the reason for “sub-replacement fertility” 
during the 1930s was as much a result of sig-
nificantly lower probabilities of survival to the 
mean age of motherhood as it was a matter of 
lower TFRs. In other words, “sub-replacement 
fertility” then (first demographic transition) 
and “sub-replacement fertility” now (second 
demographic transition) reflect different mor-
tality conditions. 
Returning to fertility as such, this clearly 
crisis-induced first transition fertility drop 
in the 1930s was not only geographically 
contained, but also of a much shorter dura-
tion than its postwar SDT counterpart, which 
spans several decades and has not yet come 
to an end. Also cohort measures of fertility 
were virtually never used at that time, hence 
a crisis-induced tempo effect (postponement 
of first marriages and first births) was misread 
as a “structural” feature that would lead to 
shrinking populations. Finally, marriage post-
ponement during the 1930s was unrelated to 
a rise in cohabitation, hence has nothing in 
common with the SDT restructuring of living 
arrangements of couples. In my opinion, the 
experience of the 1930s can hardly be inter-
preted as a “dress rehearsal” for the SDT (cf. 
Van Bavel 2010, p. 12), but as a period reac-
tion, limited in time, to the shock of severe 
economic, social, and political crises.
2 The early study by Cliquet (1992) and 
the much later presentation by Coleman 
(2004) are to my knowledge the only pub-
lished cogent critiques of the SDT, and they 
serve as the guidelines for the present analysis. 
Various unpublished critiques and comments 
were voiced during conferences or seminars.
3 A crucial distinction needs to be made 
between unplanned nonmarital fertility 
among single young women, often leading 
to single-mother households, and the often 
planned nonmarital fertility of older cohabit-
ing couples. The first type is an indicator of an 
incomplete first demographic transition and 
is caused by lack of contraceptive knowledge 
and/or practice. Only the second type is in-
dicative of the SDT. 
4 The most recent TFR levels in the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand 
are all very close to replacement level or even 
above it. This has been taken as evidence by a 
reviewer that these are not SDT countries or 
that the SDT theory simply does not hold. This 
critique overlooks the heterogeneous popula-
tion composition and the presence of subpop-
ulations that have not yet completed their 
demographic transition. In the US, the His-
panic TFR was still 3.0 in 2007, whereas that 
of non-Hispanic whites was 1.9 (including in 
this average the high fertility of Mormons and 
Evangelicals), setting the national level at 2.1 
(National Vital Statistics Report, March 2009). 
The high US teenage fertility level (which is 
rising among Hispanics) is also indicative of an 
incomplete transition. Similarly, in New Zea-
land the national TFR was above replacement 
in 2006 only because of the Maori TFR of 2.8, 
and despite the low fertility of the New Zea-
land Asians (TFR=1.5). In Australia, the TFR 
rose rapidly from 1.8 in 2005 to 2.0 in 2008. 
Here the Aborigines’ contribution was negli-
gible, but a large birth premium of $A 5,000 
(about US $ 4,500) has probably spurred the 
recuperation of births after 2004. But since 
one can have a second child only once, the 
effect of this bonus is expected to wear off (cf. 
Notes
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